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Thursday, August 19, 2010

More Bankruptcy Stuff Regarding Discharging Taxes

More Bankruptcy Stuff

 

      Income tax is dischargeable in a Chapter 13 if the claim is not yet assessed, the tax is over three years old and no returns have been filed.  If you file a return, it will start the assessment and add 240 days before the tax can be discharged in a Chapter 13.  See In re  Zeig, 194 B.R. 469,1 (Bkrtcy D.Neb) 1996.  Also see In re Daniel, 170 B.R. 466 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Geo. 1994) (failure to file a return, unassessed tax was not a priority in a chapter 13.) 

     

      Also be very careful about the filing of an offer in compromise.  The OIC will toll the 240-day period for the time it is pending plus 30 days.  See 11 U.S.C. 507(a)(8)(A)(ii). 

 

      Many people think that they can rely on the advice of the IRS.  Please check out Matter of Larson, 862 F.2d 112 (7th Cir 1988). The court ruled that the taxpayers were not entitled to rely on the IRS agent's erroneous misrepresentation that the taxes would be discharged in the bankruptcy which was filed less than 240 days after the assessment.  There was a similar result in the case of In re Howell, 120 B.R. 137 (9th Cir. BAP 1990).

 

      The issue of the validity of tax liens after a bankruptcy is a very complicated and confusing state of affairs.  In Chapter 13, there are cases that hold that a lien that is unattached to equity is not a secured claim.  See, In re Geyer, 203 B.R. 726 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Cal. 1996).  Also see In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (9th Cir BAP 1997).  The issue in Chapter 7 is more complex.  Some cases hold that a lien still survives a Chapter 7 even if it is void of equity.  See, for example, In re Houze, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 1095 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Fla.); In re Cleary, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 28 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ill.).  There are also Chapter 7 opinions that hold that an unsecured lien is a nullity.  See In re Yi, B.R. 394 (E.D.Va. 1998), Howard v. National Westminister Bank 184 B.R. 644 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y. 1995), In re Eudy, Sr. 1989 Bankr. LEXIS 2247 (Bkrtcy.M.D.La. 1989).

 

      The Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) in Part 5 - Collection Activity, Section 5.9 - Bankruptcy Handbook, states in Chapter 6 - Proof of Claim Preparation, (5.9)

 

Secured Claim

 

1.  Two basic conditions must be met for the IRS to have a secured claim:  (A) The IRS must have on file a valid pre-petition Notice of Federal Tax Lien and there must be equity in the debtor's property to which the pre-petition lien attaches.  (B) The secured claim represents the debtor's equity in all real and personal property that is listed in the debtor's schedules that are filed with the court.

 

      In the case of In re Emerson, 224 B.R.577 (Bkrtcy.E.D.N.C. 1998, the debtor's filing of an amended offer in compromise filed after the running of the 240-day period did not toll the running of the period.  The original offer in compromise was deemed rejected when the IRS notified the debtors that it would not be accepting the offer, and not when the debtors received a letter rejecting their appeal of the rejection.  See In re Emerson, 224 B.R. 577 (Bkrtcy.W.D.La 1998).   The IRS was stopped from requiring the debtor to produce tax returns three years after the debtor's bankruptcy discharge, the IRS claimed that the taxes were not discharged because the debtor failed to file returns.  The debtor alleged that he could not produce copies of the returns because the IRS had seized the originals several years before the bankruptcy.  In re McKenzie, 225 B.R. 377 (N.D.Ohio 1998).

 

      Beware of the fact that some individuals are misusing the bankruptcy court in an attempt to get out of their tax problems.  The debtor's dishonest pre-petition conduct in regard to his tax obligations may be taken into consideration on the issue of bad faith.  The Court in Matter of Hazel, 95 B.R. 481 (Mich. 1986) found the plan in bad faith when the debtor willfully failed to report any tax liabilities, purposefully prevented collection of any taxes by the IRS and ultimately filed a Chapter 13 to discharge his taxes.  In the case: In the Matter of Love, 957 F.2d 1350 (7th Cir. 1992), the court rejected a plan for bad faith because the debtor had engaged in pre-petition tax protest activity which led to his primary tax debt.  Other opinions have held that Chapter 13 may not be exploited by taxpayers who were members of tax protest groups.  See In re Paulson 170 B.R. 496 (Bkrtcy.D.CT 1994); In re Hammers 988 F2d 32 (5th Cir. 1993): Schaffner v IRS, 95 B.R. 62 (Bkrtcy. E.D.Mich 1998).  Also see In re Morimoto, 171 B.R. 85 (9th Cir BAP 1994) in which the debtor failed to file tax returns for 28 years. The court, noting that the debtor's prepetition activities were those of a tax protester, denied confirmation on the basis of bad faith.  See also, In re Greatwood, 194B.R. 637 (9th Cir.BAP 1996); In re Hopkins, 201 B.R. 993 (D. Nev. 1996).

 

 

7:11 am mdt 

Sunday, August 1, 2010

Patriot Arguments that will case you trouble

Attorney Larry Becraft has assembled the following discussion of many of the popular patriot arguments.  Since some individuals are still relying on these issues,   it is important to get out the information that their ideas simply do not work.  Thank you Larry Becraft for the effort that you put into this analysis.

 

I. The Money Issue:

 

In the seventies and early eighties, advocates of the specie provisions in Art. 1, §10, cl. 1 of the U.S. Constitution made a concerted effort to educate people about this constitutional provision, consequently people (mostly those who were deperate and ill-prepared) acting pro se began litigating the issue. The courts have rendered the following adverse decisions on this issue:

 

Adverse Federal Decisions:

 

1. Koll v. Wayzata State Bank, 397 F.2d 124 (8th Cir. 1968)
2.
United States v. Daly, 481 F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1973)
3.
Milam v. United States, 524 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1974)
4.
United States v. Scott, 521 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1975)
5.
United States v. Gardiner, 531 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1976)
6.
United States v. Wangrud, 533 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1976)
7.
United States v. Kelley, 539 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1976)
8.
United States v. Schmitz, 542 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1976)
9.
United States v. Whitesel, 543 F.2d 1176 (6th Cir. 1976)
10.
United States v. Hurd, 549 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1977)
11.
Mathes v. Commissioner, 576 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1978)
12.
United States v. Rifen, 577 F.2d 1111 (8th Cir. 1978)
13.
United States v. Anderson, 584 F.2d 369 (10th Cir. 1978)
14.
United States v. Benson, 592 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1979)
15.
Nyhus v. Commissioner, 594 F.2d 1213 (8th Cir. 1979)
16.
United States v. Hori, 470 F.Supp. 1209 (C.D.Cal. 1979)
17.
United States v. Tissi, 601 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1979)
18.
United States v. Ware, 608 F.2d 400 (10th Cir. 1979)
19.
United States v. Moon, 616 F.2d 1043 (8th Cir. 1980)
20.
United States v. Rickman, 638 F.2d 182 (10th Cir. 1980)
21.
Birkenstock v. Commissioner, 646 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1981)
22.
Lary v. Commissioner, 842 F.2d 296 (11th Cir. 1988)

 

Adverse State Decisions:

 

1. Chermack v. Bjornson, 302 Minn. 213, 223 N.W.2d 659 (1974)
2.
Leitch v. Oregon Dept. of Revenue, 519 P.2d 1045 (Or.App. 1974)
3.
Radue v. Zanaty, 293 Ala. 585, 308 So.2d 242 (1975)
4.
Rush v. Casco Bank & Trust Co., 348 A.2d 237 (Me. 1975)
5.
Allen v. Craig, 1 Kan.App.2d 301, 564 P.2d 552 (1977)
6.
State v. Pina, 90 N.M. 181, 561 P.2d 43 (N.M. 1977)
7.
Dorgan v. Kouba, 274 N.W.2d 167 (N.D. 1978)
8.
Trohimovich v. Dir., Dept. of Labor & Industry, 21 Wash.App. 243, 584 P.2d 467 (1978)
9.
Middlebrook v. Miss. State Tax Comm., 387 So.2d 726 (Miss. 1980)
10.
Daniels v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 601 S.W.2d 845 (Ark. 1980)
11.
State v. Gasser, 306 N.W.2d 205 (N.D. 1981)
12.
City of Colton v. Corbly, 323 N.W.2d 138 (S.D. 1982)
13.
Epperly v. Alaska, 648 P.2d 609 (Ak.App. 1982)
14.
Solyom v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm., 452 A.2d 1283 (Md.App. 1982)
15.
People v. Lawrence, 124 Mich.App. 230, 333 N.W.2d 525 (Mich.App. 1983)
16.
Union State Bank v. Miller, 335 N.W.2d 807 (N.D. 1983)
17.
Richardson v. Richardson, 332 N.W.2d 524 (Mich.App. 1983)
18.
Cohn v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 138 Ariz. 136, 673 P.2d 334 (1983)
19.
First Nat. Bank of Black Hills v. Treadway, 339 N.W.2d 119 (S.D. 1983)
20.
Herald v. State, 107 Idaho 640, 691 P.2d 1255 (1984)
21.
Allnutt v. State, 59 Md.App. 694, 478 A.2d 321 (1984)
22.
Spurgeon v. F.T.B., 160 Cal.App.3d 524, 206 Cal.Rptr. 636 (1984)
23.
Rothaker v. Rockwall County Central Appraisal Dist., 703 S.W.2d 235 (Tex.App. 1985)
24.
De Jong v. County of Chester, 98 Pa. Cmwlth. 85, 510 A.2d 902 (1986)
25.
Baird v. County Assessors of Salt Lake & Utah Counties, 779 P.2d 676 (Utah 1989)
26.
State v. Sanders, 923 S.W.2d 540 (Tenn. 1996).

 

II. Wages Are Income:

 

Back in about 1979 or 1980, Bob Golden and Pete Soehnlen published a work entitled Are You Required, which persuasively advocated the argument that wages are not income. However, desperate people championed this issue and lost in the following cases:

1. United States v. Romero, 640 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981)
2.
Lonsdale v. CIR, 661 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1981)(rejecting "even exchange" argument)
3.
United States v. Lawson, 670 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1982)
4.
Granzow v. CIR, 739 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1984)
5.
Hansen v. United States, 744 F.2d 658 (8th Cir. 1984)
6.
Perkins v. CIR, 746 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1984)
7.
Schiff v. CIR, 751 F.2d 116 (2nd Cir. 1984)
8.
Ficalora v. CIR, 751 F.2d 85, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that income includes compensation for services)
9.
Lovell v. United States, 755 F.2d 517, 519 (7th Cir. 1984)
10.
United States v. Latham, 754 F.2d 747 (7th Cir. 1985)
11.
Hyslep v. United States, 765 F.2d 1083 (11th Cir. 1985)
12.
Coleman v. CIR, 791 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1986)
13. Stubbs v. Commissioner of IRS, 797 F.2d 936, 938 (11th Cir. 1986) (rejecting argument that wages are not taxable income as "patently frivolous")
14.
Wilcox v. CIR, 848 F.2d 1007, 1008 (9th Cir. 1988)
15.
Maisano v. United States, 908 F.2d 408, 409 (9th Cir. 1990), and Maisano v. United States, 940 F.2d 499, 501-02 (9th Cir. 1991)
16.
United States v. Gerards, 999 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1993).

Jeff Dickstein, lawyer "extraordinare" from California, later Alaska, Montana, Tennessee and now Oklahoma, has written a book entitled Judicial Tyranny, which discusses this issue in great detail, including all the adverse decisions on this issue through 1989. When Jeff and I were about to start the conspiracy trial of Vern Holland and Dave Mauldin in Tulsa in August, 1990, Jeff announced that his book was hot off the press. When we got the first copy and looked at his book just days before we were to start that trial in federal court in Tulsa, we noticed that the front cover contained the seal of the local federal court as well as a likeness of one of the local federal judges. At times, Jeff can be harrowing. However, we got a hung jury in that case and afterwards, 6 of the jurors, including the forelady, came and joined Vern's patriot organization.

 

III. The IRS is a Delaware corporation:

 

Back in 1982 or 1983, somebody started circulating the argument that the IRS was a private corporation which had been created in Delaware in 1933. If it was created only in 1933, then why do we have the following appropriations for this agency found in acts of Congress a decade before 1933:
 
42 Stat. 375 (2-17-22); 42 Stat. 454 (3-20-22); 42 Stat. 1096 (1-3-23); 43 Stat. 71 (4-4-24); 43 Stat. 693 (12-5-24); 43 Stat. 757 (1-20-25); 43 Stat. 770 (1-22-25); 44 Stat. 142 (3-2-26); 44 Stat. 868 (7-3-26); 44 Stat. 1033 (1-26-27); 45 Stat. 168, 1034 (1928); 68 Stat. 86, 145, 807 (1954).

This is indeed a frivolous argument and has properly been rejected by the courts; see Young v. IRS, 596 F.Supp. 141, 147 (N.D. Ind. 1984). The real issue is whether the IRS has been created by law.

 

 IV. The IMF Argument:

 

Some contend that the Secretary of the Treasury is in reality a foreign agent under the control of the IMF; the argument has been rejected by the courts.

1. United States v. Rosnow, 977 F.2d 399, 413 (8th Cir. 1992)
2.
United States v. Jagim, 978 F.2d 1032, 1036 (8th Cir. 1992)
3.
United States v. Higgins, 987 F.2d 543, 545 (8th Cir. 1993).

 

V. Non-resident Aliens:

 

Some contend we are for tax purposes non-resident aliens; again, this improper argument has been correctly rejected by the courts.

1. United States v. Sloan, 939 F.2d 499, 501 (7th Cir. 1991)
2.
United States v. Jagim, 978 F.2d 1032, 1036 (8th Cir. 1992)
3.
United States v. Hilgeford, 7 F.3d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1993)
4.
United States v. Mundt, 29 F.3d 233 (6th Cir. 1994) ("federal zone" case)
5.
Larue v. United States, 959 F.Supp. 957 (C.D.Ill. 1997).

But the rejection by the courts of this issue has not deterred Lynn Meredith, who has continued to promote this argument through her book, Vultures in Eagles Clothing, via a multi-level sales scheme. Fraud is a knowing misrepresentation of facts (or in this case, law) to another upon which that other party relies to his detriment. Concerned Americans have been trying the program promoted by Meredith in her book, but when they get into trouble, they get absolutely no help from Meredith as she refuses to even answer their calls. She spends her spare time on cruise ships.

Incidentally, when Lynn was here in Alabama, she stated to James Shackelford of Tuscaloosa, that she has made better than 3 million bux off this movement.

 

VI. The Form 1040 is Really a Codicil to a

Will:

 

This argument was rejected in Richey v. Ind. Dept. of State Revenue, 634 N.E. 2d 1375 (Ind. 1994), along with other popular arguments of that date.

 

VII. Filing 1099s against IRS Agents:

 

At one time, some asserted that when an agent of the government inflicted damaged upon somebody, the proper response should be filing a Form 1099 against the agent because the agent was "enriched" by the damaged so inflicted. Parties doing this went to jail.

1. United States v. Yagow, 953 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1992)
2.
United States v. Kuball, 976 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1992)
3.
United States v. Dykstra, 991 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1993).

Of course, today we have essentially the same thing in the format of filing of common law liens. More than enough people have gone to jail with such lunacy.

 

VIII. Land Patents:

 

Back in 1983 and 1984, Carol Landi popularized an argument that the land patent was the highest and best form of title and that by updating the patent in your own name, you could defeat any mortgages. This contention violated many principles of real property and when Carol started trying to get patents for most of the land in California brought up into her own name, she went to jail. Others who have raised this crazy argument lost the issue.

1. Landi v. Phelps, 740 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1984)
2.
Sui v. Landi, 209 Cal.Rptr. 449 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1985)
3.
Hilgeford v. People's Bank, 607 F.Supp. 536 (N.D.Ind. 1985)
4.
Nixon v. Individual Head of St. Joseph Mtg. Co., 612 F.Supp. 253 (N.D. Ind. 1985)
5.
Nixon v. Phillipoff, 615 F.Supp. 890 (N.D. Ind. 1985)
6.
Wisconsin v. Glick, 782 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1986)
7.
Britt v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n. of St. Louis, 505 N.E.2d 387 (Ill. App. 1987).

 

IX. Not a "Person" Under the Tax Code:

 

Some have contended that they were not "persons" under the Internal Revenue Code, an argument which has been lost.

1. Lovell v. United States, 755 F.2d 517, 519 (7th Cir. 1984) (all individuals, natural or unnatural, are  subject to federal income tax on their wages)
2.
United States v. Karlin, 785 F.2d 90, 91 (3d Cir. 1986)
3.
United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 1986)(defendant who contended she was not a "taxpayer" because she was an "absolute, freeborn and natural individual" raised frivolous argument);
4.
United States v. Price, 798 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1986)
5.
Itz v. United States Tax Court, 1987 WL 15893, at 5, 87-2 USTC ¶ 9497 (W.D.Tex. May 6, 1987) (claim of plaintiff that he is a "de jure" citizen as opposed to a "de facto" citizen is without merit)
6.
Lonsdale v. United States, 919 F.2d 1440, 1447-48 (10th Cir. 1990)(plaintiff is a person subject to federal income tax, invalidating numerous other frivolous tax protester arguments)
7.
United States v. Silevan, 985 F.2d 962, 970 (8th Cir. 1993)
8.
United States v. Gerads, 999 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1993)(these parties raised but had rejected the arguments that the US has no "inland jurisdiction," that wages were not income, and that the federal income tax is voluntary. "And finally, we reject appellant's contention that they are not citizens of the United States, but rather 'Free Citizens of the Republic of Minnesota,' and consequently not subject to taxation").

 

X. Notice of Levy:

 

A popular argument currently circulating is that a mere notice of levy is not equal to a levy and thus may not be used for tax collection purposes. The courts have not accepted this idea.

1. United States v. Eiland, 223 F.2d 118, 121 (4th Cir. 1955)
2.
Rosenblum v. United States, 300 F.2d 843, 844-45 (1st Cir. 1962)
3.
United States v. Pittman, 449 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 1971)
4.
In re Chicagoland Ideel Cleaners, Inc., 495 F.2d 1283, 1285 (7th Cir. 1974)
5.
Wolfe v. United States, 798 F.2d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 1986)
6.
Sims v. United States, 359 U.S. 108, 79 S.Ct. 641 (1959).

 

XI. The UCC Argument:

 

Some assert that some unknown treaty back in the 1930s placed us under the control of the "international bankers," thus every action filed in this country, both civil and criminal alike, is for the benefit of the bankers. Under these facts, when the government attacks a patriot, he should assert the UCC argument; this silly contention has been rejected.

1. United States v. Stoecklin, 848 F.Supp. 1521 (M.D. Fla. 1994)
2.
United States v. Greenstreet, 912 F.Supp. 224 (N.D.Tex. 1996)(also raised flag and common law court issues)
3.
United States v. Klimek, 952 F.Supp. 1100 (E.D.Pa. 1997)(also raised nom de guerre and flag issues).

 

XII. The CFR Cross Reference Index:

 

The Code of Federal Regulations contains a separate volume which list various statutes and the regulations which implement those statutes. This is not an exclusive list nor is it an admission made by the government that there are no regulations for Title 26, U.S.C. Parties making this argument have suffered defeat.

1. United States v. Cochrane, 985 F.2d 1027, 1031 (9th Cir. 1993)
2.
Russell v. United States, 95 CCH Tax Cases ¶ 50029 (W.D. Mich. 1994)
3.
Reese v. CIR, 69 TCM 2814, TC Memo 1995-244 (1995)(this and several other arguments described as "legalistic gibberish")
4.
Morgan v. CIR, 78 AFTR2d 96-6633 (M.D.Fla. 1996)
5.
Stafford v. CIR, TCM 1997-50.

 

XIII. The Flag Issue:

 

A current popular argument is that the gold fringed flag indicates the admiralty jurisdiction of the court. Naturally, pro ses have made this argument and lost.

1. Vella v. McCammon, 671 F.Supp. 1128, 1129 (S.D. Tex. 1987)(the argument has "no arguable basis in law or fact")
2.
Comm. v. Appel, 652 A.2d 341, 343 (Pa.Super. 1994)(the contention is a "preposterous claim")
3.
United States v. Schiefen, 926 F.Supp. 877, 884 (D.S.D. 1995): in this case, the CFR cross reference index argument, and those regarding the UCC, common law courts and the flag issue were rejected.
4.
McCann v. Greenway, 952 F.Supp. 647 (W.D.Mo. 1997)
5.
Sadlier v. Payne, 974 F.Supp. 1411 (D.Utah 1997)
6.
Schneider v. Schlaefer, 975 F.Supp. 1160 (E.D.Wis. 1997)

Of course, there are other decisions which have not been published. But against all odds, Dave Miller still travels the country promoting this lost cause.

 

XIV. Common Law Court:

 

These courts have been declared non-existent.

1. Kimmel v. Burnet County Appraisal Dist., 835 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex.App. 1992).

 

XV. "Nom de Guerre":

 

According to a book written by Berkheimer, a "nom de guerre" is a war name symbolized by a given name being written in capital letters. The argument contends that because of events in 1933, we have been made "enemies" and government indicates our status as enemies by the nom de guerre. If this is true, then why have the styles of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court since its establishment been in caps? This argument has gotten lots of people in trouble. For example, Mike Kemp of the Gadsden Militia defended himself on state criminal charges with this argument and he was thrown into jail. I have not even seen a decent brief on this issue which was predicated upon cases you can find in an ordinary law library. In any event, at least one case has rejected this argument; see United States v. Klimek, 952 F.Supp. 1100 (E.D.Pa. 1997).

 

XV. Title 26 is not positive law:

 

Ryan v. Bilby, 764 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1985)(stating that "Congress's failure to enact a title into positive law has only evidentiary significance and does not render the underlying enactment invalid or unenforceable"); United States v. Zuger, 602 F. Supp. 889, 891-92 (D. Conn. 1984) (holding that "the failure of Congress to enact a title as such and in such form into positive law . . . in no way impugns the validity, effect, enforceability or constitutionality of the laws as contained and set forth in the title"), aff'd without op., 755 F.2d 915 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 805 (1985); Young v. IRS, 596 F. Supp. 141, 149 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (asserting that "even if Title 26 was not itself enacted into positive law, that does not mean that the laws under that title are null and void"); Berkshire Hathaway Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 780, 784 (1985) (averring that the I.R.C. "is truly 'positive law'"), aff'd, 802 F.2d 429 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

 

XVI. Wangrudites:

 

1. McKinney v. Regan, 599 F.Supp. 126, 129 (M.D.La. 1984)("Petitioner's shield of the 'Common Law' as an 'Unenfranchised Sovereign Individual of the United States of America, a Republic,' provides him with precisely the same degree of protection from federal income taxation as did the Ghost Dance of the Sioux warrior from the repeating rifles of the federal Calvary [sic] -- ZERO")

2. Lonsdale v. United States, 919 F.2d 1440, 1448 (10th Cir. 1990)(the following arguments are completely lacking in legal merit and patently frivolous: (1) individuals ("free born, white, preamble, sovereign, natural, individual common law 'de jure' citizens of a state, etc.") are not "persons" subject to taxation under the Internal Revenue Code; (2) the authority of the United States is confined to the District of Columbia; (3) the income tax is a direct tax which is invalid absent apportionment; (4) the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution is either invalid or applies only to corporations; (5) wages are not income; (6) the income tax is voluntary); United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Buras, 633 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1980).
 
3.
United States v. Kruger, 923 F.2d 587, 587-88 (8th Cir. 1991)("The Krugers' principle argument below and on appeal is that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution unlawfully purported to bestow citizenship upon non-white races and other 'artificial statutory persons.' This argument is absurd").

 

Perhaps the most famous "Wangrudite" was John Cheek, whose criminal conviction went to the U.S. Supreme Court; see Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 111 S.Ct. 604 (1991). John sent to me copies of his motions and briefs that he filed in his case, one of which was just a single page motion which in essence stated that he could not be prosecuted because he was not a 14th amendment citizen. Naturally, such a non-substantive motion was denied. Cheek's appeal would have involved this argument if he had reached the conclusion that it had merit. However, the only issue which was decided in the appeal to the Supreme Court regarded the validity of the "willfulness" jury instruction given at trial.

 

XVII. Implementing regulations:

 

United States v. Hartman, 915 F.Supp. 1227 (M.D.Fla. 1996): argument regarding implementing regs and the cross references in CFR index held frivolous.
Stafford v. CIR, TCM 1997-50.

 

XVIII. Taxes are contractual:

 

    In McLaughlin v. CIR, 832 F.2d 986, 987 (7th Cir. 1987), this argument was held to be without merit.
 
XIX. SIMPLE FACTS REGARDING "SUBJECTS OF THE BRITISH CROWN" ISSUE

 

1. The Articles of Confederation provided as follows:

"Article II. Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled."

2. Our country and the British Crown signed the Treaty of Peace on September 3, 1783, the first provision of which reads as follows:

"His Britannic Majesty acknowledges the said United States, viz, New-Hampshire, Massachusetts-Bay, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York,  New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia, to  be free, sovereign and independent States; that he treats with them as such; and for himself, his heirs and successors, relinquishes all claims to the government, proprietary and  territorial rights of the same, and every part thereof."

 

Does this 1783 Peace Treaty still exist? All one needs to do to confirm this is to check out a government  publication  entitled  "Treaties in Force"  which  can be found  in any  good library, especially a university library. Under the list of our treaties with Great Britain and the United Kingdom,  you will find that this 1783 treaty is still in effect, at least a part of it: "Only article 1 is in force." The War of 1812 resulted in modifications of this treaty and so did later treaties.

3. The courts have not been silent regarding the effect of the Declaration of Independence and the Treaty of Peace. For example, the consequences of independence was explained in Harcourt v. Gaillard, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 523, 526, 527 (1827), where the Supreme Court stated:

"There was no territory within the United States that was claimed in any other right than that of some one of the confederated states; therefore, there could be no acquisition of territory made by the United States distinct from, or independent of some one of the states.

"Each declared itself sovereign and independent, according to the limits of its territory.
"[T]he soil and sovereignty within their acknowledged limits were as much theirs at the declaration of independence as at this hour."

In M'Ilvaine v. Coxe's Lessee, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 209, 212 (1808), the Supreme Court  held:

"This opinion is predicated upon a principle which is believed to be undeniable, that the several states which composed this Union, so far at least as regarded their municipal regulations, became entitled, from the time when they declared themselves independent, to all the rights and powers of sovereign states, and that they did not derive them from concessions made by the British king. The treaty of peace contains a recognition of their independence, not a grant of it. From hence it results, that the laws of the several state governments were the laws of sovereign states, and as such were obligatory upon the people of such state, from the time they were enacted."

In reference to the Treaty of Peace, this same court stated:

"It contains an acknowledgment of the independence and sovereignty of the United States, in their political capacities, and a relinquishment on the part of His Britannic Majesty, of all claim to the government, propriety and territorial rights of the same. These concessions amounted, no doubt, to a formal renunciation of all claim to the allegiance of the citizens of the United States."

Finally, in Inglis v. Trustees of the Sailor's Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Peters) 99, 120-122 (1830), the question squarely arose as to whether Americans are "subjects of the crown," a proposition flatly rejected by the Court:

"It is universally admitted both in English courts and in those of our own country, that all persons born within the colonies of North America, whilst subject to the crown of Great Britain, were natural born British subjects, and it must necessarily follow that that character was changed by the separation of the colonies from the parent State, and the acknowledgment of their independence.

"The rule as to the point of time at which the American antenati ceased to be British subjects, differs in this country and in England, as established by the courts of justice in the respective countries. The English rule is to take the date of the Treaty of Peace in 1783. Our rule is to take the date of the Declaration of Independence."

In support of the rule set forth in this case, the court cited an English case to demonstrate that the English courts had already decided that Americans were not subjects of the crown:

"The doctrine of perpetual allegiance is not applied by the British courts to the American antenati. This is fully shown by the late case of Doe v. Acklam, 2 Barn. & Cresw. 779. Chief Justice Abbott says: ‘James Ludlow, the father of Francis May, the lessor of the plaintiff, was undoubtedly born a subject of Great Britain. He was born in a part of America which was at the time of his birth a British colony, and parcel of the dominions of the crown of Great Britain; but upon the facts found, we are of opinion that he was not a subject of the crown of Great Britain at the time of the birth of his daughter. She was born after the independence of the colonies was recognized by the crown of Great Britain; after the colonies had become United States, and their inhabitants generally citizens of those States, and her father, by his continued residence in those States, manifestly became a citizen of them.' He considered the Treaty of Peace as a release from their allegiance of all British subjects who remained there. A declaration, says he, that a State shall be free, sovereign and independent, is a declaration that the people composing the State shall no longer be considered as subjects of the sovereign by whom such a declaration is made."

 

XX. The US is "foreign" to the states.

 

    A popular belief promoted in the freedom movement is the concept or idea that the United States is a foreign sovereign as regards the states. How this idea got started is beyond me because the U.S. Supreme Court and other courts have concluded otherwise; see Clafin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876)("The United States is not a foreign sovereignty as regards the several States"); Severson v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 88 P.2d 344, 347 (Ok. 1939)(quotes Clafin); Bowles v. Heckman, 64 N.E.2d 660, 662 (Ind. 1946)(quotes Clafin); Kersting v. Hardgrove, 48 A.2d 309, 310 (N.J. 1946)(summarizes Clafin); Harrison v. Herzig Bldg. & Supply Co., 290 Ky. 445, 161 S.W.2d 908, 910 (1942)(quotes Clafin); Robinson v. Norato, 71 R.I. 256, 43 A.2d 467, 471 (1945)(quotes Clafin and further states "the several States of the Union are neither foreign to the United States nor are they foreign to each other").

    There are lots of theories which float through the freedom movement and people are very prone to accept any contention or position without question. But if they fail to check out the sources upon which they rely, they run the risk of believing something which has no foundation and will not work in court.
    
   
 

 

 

11:14 am mdt 


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